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B THE CURRENT LAW ON CAUSATION-IN-FACT AND APPORTION-
MENT OF LOSS
(1) Sine qua non causation
(2) Risk creation as causation: McGhee v NCB
(3) An alternative to risk creation as causation: lost chance recovery
(4) Causal orthodoxy reasserted: Barker v Corus
(5) Apportionment of loss
C FUTURE LOSSES: GREGG v SCOTT
(1) Future damage not existing physical damage
(2) Doctor’s negligence not the cause of the loss
(3) Loss of chance analysis too diffi cult for medical negligence cases
(4) Conclusion
D THE SEARCH FOR NEW TYPES OF ACTIONABLE LOSS ON TO 
WHICH TO ATTACH LOST CHANCE CLAIMS
(1) Demonstrable physical injury
(2) Pleural plaques as harm
(3) Chance/fear of future illness as harm
(4) Cumulating de minimis harms to constitute actionable harm
E SOME CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In recent years British jurisprudence is fortunate to have benefi ted from a plentiful 
supply of case law and academic writing on the requirement of causation in 
delictual or tortious liability.1 The relevant decisions and academic writings have 
*  Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Edinburgh.
1 The term “British jurisprudence” is used as a loose umbrella term to refer to the jurisprudence of 
the three independent British legal jurisdictions, namely Scotland, England and Wales, and Northern 
Ireland. Recent British academic consideration of causation in delict or tort includes the following: R 
Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts (1999); J Stapleton, “Unpacking causation”, in P Cane 
ELR11_1_02_Hogg.indd   8 29/11/06   17:10:12
9re-establishing orthodoxy in the realm of causationVol 11 2007
enabled the law to develop a relatively sophisticated analysis of precisely how the 
causal requirement may be demonstrated both in simple as well as complex cases. 
In this respect the legal systems of Scotland and England may be contrasted with 
other jurisdictions where, due to a paucity of judicial or academic consideration, 
the rules of causation have remained largely undeveloped.2
The relative good fortune for British legal scholarship in relation to causation 
has, however, not been arrived at without some wrong turns along the way. One 
such wrong turn was made, it will be argued below, by the House of Lords in its 
decision in McGhee v National Coal Board.3 The House of Lords took the oppor-
tunity to correct this wrong turn in its recent decision in Barker v Corus (UK) 
plc,4 an analysis of which decision forms much of the substance of section B of 
this article. Even with the correction of causal wrong turns, however, the courts 
continue to struggle with some causal issues, in particular those surrounding losses 
which may arise in the future.
This article seeks in the fi rst place to review where the law presently stands in 
Scotland and England in relation to so-called “causation-in fact”, otherwise known 
as “factual causation” or “natural causation”. Causation-in-fact is causation as it 
operates in the real world, without regard to its legal signifi cance in the determina-
tion of responsibility for harm.5 Specifi c consideration will be given to the recent 
realignment of the material increase in risk test of causation-in-fact undertaken in 
the Barker appeal, which it will be argued was correctly decided.
Secondly, because no test of causation-in-fact can deal adequately with cases 
of inherent causal uncertainty, the article argues that other solutions must be 
adopted to deal with such cases. One category of case involves claims of loss of 
future prospects, and will be discussed with specifi c reference to the decision 
of the House of Lords in Gregg v Scott.6 It will be argued that that decision was 
correct, and that any claims for loss of future prospects ought to be anchored by 
and J Gardner (eds), Relating to Responsibility: Essays in Honour of Tony Honoré on his 80th Birthday; 
(2001); J Stapleton, “Lords a’leaping evidentiary gaps” (2002) 10 Torts LJ 276; J Stapleton, “Causation-
in-fact and the scope of liability for consequences” (2003) 119 LQR 388; M Hogg, “The role of causation 
in delict” 2005 JR 89. 
2 One such example is South Africa, where the requirement of causation-in-fact in delict has remained 
essentially undeveloped beyond the simple sine qua non test. 
3 1973 SC (HL) 37, [1973] 1 WLR 1.
4 [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 WLR 1027.
5 Causation-in-fact is often distinguished from what has been termed “legal causation”, although it has 
been strongly argued by some that it is better to avoid the term “legal causation” altogether, and refer 
instead more transparently to considerations affecting the attribution of responsibility for harm. That 
argument is, however, outwith the purposes of this paper. See further Stapleton, “Causation-in-fact” (n 
1) at 411f; R Wright, “The grounds and extent of legal responsibility” (2003) 40 San Diego LRev 1425; 
Hogg (n 1) at 138-148.
6 [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176. 
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reference to claimable present loss.
Thirdly, the article examines an issue which, given the decisions in Barker and 
Gregg, is likely to constitute the next causally problematic issue for the House of 
Lords: what may constitute existing physical harm for the purposes of a damages 
claim for personal injury? This may not appear, at fi rst glance, to be a causal issue 
at all. However, its relevance for causation lies in the fact that, so long as some 
demonstrable existing physical harm can be demonstrated to have been caused by 
a defender, recovery in respect of causally uncertain future harm can be attached 
to a claim for damages for the existing harm. The issue arose most recently in the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Grieves v FT Everard & Sons Ltd,7 considered 
below.
Allied to these causal matters is the issue of apportionment of damages. The 
issue is related because to say that a defender caused a loss does not fully answer 
the question of who should be liable for that loss, given that there may be other 
defenders who are equally deemed to have caused the loss. In such cases of 
multiple causation of harm the courts have struggled to identify which solution to 
apportionment of liability is most equitable in different types of case. Inevitably, 
the need to do justice not just to individuals but to categories of litigant such as 
victims’ groups, or manufacturers, employers and ultimately insurers, has troubled 
the courts. Because the question of apportionment of liability has featured in 
many causal cases, the currently applicable rules are also considered below.
B. THE CURRENT LAW ON CAUSATION-IN-FACT AND 
 APPORTIONMENT OF LOSS
(1) Sine qua non causation
The position of the sine qua non, or “but for”, test as the starting point for the 
analysis of causation-in-fact in Scots and English Law is well established, a 
position which has traditionally been seen as uncontroversial.8 The test has also 
been accepted as the starting point in the examination of causation-in-fact in most 
other Western jurisdictions.9 The test operates by requiring a court to consider, of 
7 [2006] EWCA Civ 27. 
8 For its application in Scottish cases see, for instance, McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd 1962 
SC (HL) 70; Porter v Strathclyde Regional Council 1991 SLT 446; Binnie v Rederij Theodoro BV 1993 
SC 71.
9 Some Civilian jurisdictions cast the “but for” test in terms of an “equivalence theory”, which holds that 
every condition without which the damage would not have occurred is a cause of the damage: this is the 
case for German Law’s Äquivalenztheorie and French Law’s théorie de l’équivalence des conditions. See 
further on French and German Law, W van Gerven et al, Tort Law (Common Law of Europe Casebooks) 
(2000) ch 4. 
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a possible cause of injury c, whether, but for the operation of that cause, the result 
r would still have occurred. This is counterfactual analysis:10 it tests necessity of 
effect by asking whether or not the result would have occurred in the absence 
of the given cause. Philosophers call this sense of necessity “strong necessity”.11 
Because, however, causes do not always operate singly to produce results but can 
form part of a set of causes (or “conditions”) suffi cient to produce a result, and 
because different sets of causes may equally produce the same result, the concept 
of necessity also has a weak sense in which it denotes that, while c may not have 
been necessary for result r, nonetheless c was a necessary member of a set of 
conditions suffi cient for r.12
Most outcomes are produced by such sets of causes. This, however, is not 
necessarily productive of diffi culty. Where, for instance, two causes c1 and c2 
have cumulatively produced a result of greater magnitude than would have been 
produced by either cause operating alone, then one can say that but for each of 
c1 and c2 a specifi c magnitude of the overall harm would have been avoided. Any 
cause which thus “materially contributes” to the totality an overall injury is a sine 
qua non cause of that injury, even if it can be shown that the injury would still have 
occurred to a lesser extent in the absence of that cause. That much was settled by 
the House of Lords in Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings13 when it developed the 
material contribution gloss to the sine qua non test. What that case implies about 
apportionment of loss is rather more troublesome, as discussed below.
More problematic for the sine qua non test are cases of multiple causation 
where neither c1 nor c2 alone was necessary for r to occur because the other of the 
causes would have been productive of r to exactly the same degree in any event. 
For instance:
(i) Two vehicles, driven by D1 and D2 respectively, collide with a pedestrian, 
P. P is killed. Either collision on its own would have caused P’s death.
(ii) P is exposed to toxic waste from three different polluters, D1, D2 and D3. 
P develops cancer. The cancer would have resulted from the toxic effect 
produced by any one of the polluters acting on its own.
These cases are examples of “duplicative” or “over-determined” causation. The 
“but for” test, even with its material contribution gloss, does not adequately deal 
10 See further Hogg, (n 1) at 102 n 47.
11 See further on the strong and weak senses of necessity, as well as suffi ciency of outcome, Hogg (n 1) at 
101-106. 
12 This test of necessary membership of a set suffi cient for the outcome is capable of producing a more 
comprehensive test of causation than the sine qua non test currently used by the courts. The former is 
commonly called the “NESS” test: see text at n 15 below.
13 1956 SC (HL) 26, [1956] AC 613.
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with such cases, unless one infers a fi ctional material contribution,14 because no 
individual cause can be said to have made any necessary difference to the outcome. 
Such cases can, however, be resolved adequately by using a more focused test for 
causation-in-fact, commonly called the “NESS” test.15 This test has not thus far 
been adopted by any jurisdiction within the United Kingdom, but I have argued 
elsewhere that it would provide a more comprehensive test for establishing causa-
tion-in-fact.16
Taken with its material contribution gloss, the sine qua non test, while not 
able to deal with all complex cases of multiple causation, accords at least with 
an intuitive sense that the process of counterfactual analysis is appropriate for 
testing causation-in-fact. That virtue is not shared by the material increase in risk 
test introduced into the law by the House of Lords in 1972 in McGhee v National 
Coal Board.17
(2) Risk creation as causation: McGhee v NCB
In McGhee the House of Lords decided that mere risk creation was suffi cient to 
constitute a causal connection between harmful conduct and injury. The defender 
was held to have caused the pursuer’s dermatitis merely because its behaviour in 
prolonging his exposure to abrasive dust had increased the risk of his contracting 
the disease. There was no evidence that, but for the defender’s behaviour, the 
pursuer would not have contracted dermatitis, or would have contracted it in a less 
severe form. Their Lordships decided, however, that there was no essential differ-
ence between the defender’s having materially increased the risk that the pursuer 
would contract dermatitis and having materially contributed to that dermatitis.
As a result of this decision, mere risk creation became suffi cient in certain cases 
to satisfy a causal connection to actual physical harm.18 Yet it is hard to see how 
risk creation can equate to causation. My careless driving may risk injury to pedes-
trians but does not of itself occasion physical harm unless the vehicle strikes them; 
my misrepresentation about an individual’s creditworthiness may create a risk of 
14 As arguably occurred in the House of Lords decision in Wardlaw, where their Lordships inferred that 
each of the machines producing substantial amounts of noxious dust must have contributed materially 
to the totality of dust inhaled by the pursuer, even though it could not be shown from which machine 
the relevant dust particles came. 
15 The NESS acronym signifi es that what is at issue is whether the cause is a necessary element for the 
suffi ciency of a set of antecedent conditions suffi cient for the outcome. 
16 See Hogg (n 1) at 104-106. 
17 1973 SC (HL) 37, [1973] 1 WLR 1. 
18 Risk creation already operated in the fi eld of consequential losses, where loss of future prospects relating 
to existing physical harm might be claimed, and in the fi eld of lost chance recovery, where the harm sued 
for was the loss of the opportunity of avoiding actual harm rather than the actual harm itself. However, 
in each of these types of case, the risk of harm was treated as the loss itself.
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fi nancial loss to anyone who lends to that individual but cannot of itself cause 
actual harm unless such misrepresentation is acted upon by a lender. Creating a 
risk of harm is not the same as causing that harm. To assert otherwise is a legal 
fi ction, and a rather unconvincing one at that.
The decision in McGhee fundamentally undermined the rule that a connec-
tion, demonstrated by counterfactual analysis, was needed between harm and loss 
before causation could be established. It opened up the possibility that a defender 
might be held liable for damage which in actuality he had not caused, save in 
the fi ctional sense of having created the risk of its occurrence. The decision in 
McGhee to bend the rules of causation was motivated by policy, specifi cally a 
concern that demonstrably negligent defenders should not be permitted to avoid 
liability for harm merely because the pursuer was unable, as a result of an inherent 
unpredictability in the causal chain, to establish causation according to the usual 
requirements. Concern for pursuers in such a position was doubtless commend-
able, but an alternative mechanism could have been adopted by which to provide 
an equitable balancing between the interests of pursuer and defender, namely lost 
chance recovery. The House of Lords chose not to follow such alternative route, 
and embarked instead on a risk-based causal analysis which itself ran the substan-
tial risk of future application to even less causally robust facts. That danger was 
demonstrated in Wilsher v Essex AHA,19 although in the event the House of Lords 
refused to sanction the expansion of the McGhee principle which would have been  
necessary to permit recovery in that case.20
After Wilsher, the unorthodox approach taken in McGhee lay dormant for 
fi fteen years. However, the upsurge in claims for asbestos-related illness provided 
the impetus for the House of Lords to re-assert the McGhee principle. In Fairchild 
v Glenhaven Funeral Services,21 the House of Lords reaffi rmed its earlier view 
that mere risk creation can be considered the equivalent of causation in cases of 
causally indeterminate physical harm. It did so within the context of a claim for 
damages against a number of different tortfeasors, each of which had contributed 
a risk that Mr Fairchild might contract a mesothelioma of the pleura by negligently 
exposing him to asbestos fi bres. Unlike McGhee there were multiple defendants, 
but as in McGhee the injury suffered was a so-called “indivisible” one,22 so that it 
19 [1988] AC 1074. 
20 The principal difference in the Wilsher claim lay in the fact that the harm sustained might have arisen 
as a result of one of a number of different types of causal agency, not merely a single causal agent such 
as the brick dust in McGhee.  
21 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32.
22 In other words, the illness did not vary in severity in relation to the period of exposure to the harmful 
agent. On the contrary, the medical evidence indicated that a mesothelioma of the pleura might be trig-
gered by a single asbestos fi bre.
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was not possible at the time of trial to determine which period of exposure had 
triggered the fatal injury. The House of Lords, applying the McGhee causal fi ction, 
held that each defendant which had materially exposed Mr Fairchild to the risk 
could properly be said to have caused the injury.
Fairchild extended the McGhee principle from injuries involving one defender 
to those involving multiple defenders, but otherwise left it unchanged. In both 
McGhee and Fairchild the crucial factor was an inherent uncertainty as to whether 
the defender’s negligent behaviour had caused or materially contributed to an 
injury. Indeed, the subsequent recognition in Barker v Corus that the principle 
can apply to cases where some of the causes may be non-negligent23 merely 
emphasises the similarity of Barker and Fairchild with McGhee, for in McGhee 
the initial exposure of the pursuer to the abrasive dust had also been non-negli-
gent. In all three cases liability was established purely because the defender’s 
negligent conduct created a risk of injury. It is therefore incorrect to suggest, as 
some may, that the new approach taken in Barker revises Fairchild, a similarly 
multiple-defender case, but not the single-defender case of McGhee.
(3) An alternative to risk creation as causation: lost chance recovery
In both McGhee and Fairchild the House of Lords might have provided a better 
solution to the problem at hand by using lost chance analysis. Lost chance analysis 
permits a pursuer (or claimant),24 in restricted circumstances, to recover not for the 
actual damage suffered, but for the lost chance or opportunity of having avoided 
that damage. This chance or opportunity is evidently not a tangible loss to person 
or property, but may nonetheless be considered a valuable commodity. Numerous 
examples of lost chance recovery exist in the Scottish and English jurisprudence.25 
The doctrine can only be utilised when there is an inherent causal uncertainty 
about whether the actual harm suffered would have been caused absent the faulty 
behaviour of the wrongdoer. In other words, lost chance analysis can be utilised 
where asking the question, “but for the wrongful behaviour of D, would P still 
have suffered the loss?”, cannot produce an answer either way. Such causal uncer-
tainty can arise either because of a lack of scientifi c knowledge (such as prevails in 
relation to the aetiology of many indivisible diseases) or because of the inherent 
unpredictability of human behaviour.
Lost chance analysis has two principal virtues over the material increase in risk 
23 [2006] UKHL 20 at para 17 per Lord Hoffmann.
24 The terms will be used interchangeably, as with defender and defendant. 
25 See, for instance, Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786; Kyle v P & J Stormonth Darling 1994 SLT 191; 
Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602; First Interstate Bank of California v Cohen 
Arnold, The Times, 11 December 1995; Paul v Ogilvy 2001 SLT 171.
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approach adopted in McGhee and Fairchild. First, it maintains the traditional 
rules of causation. Before recovery for a lost chance is permitted, the pursuer 
must still show that, prior to the defender’s fault, there was the chance of avoiding 
the injury, and that, but for the defender’s fault, the pursuer would not have lost 
that chance. In other words, in a lost chance action the gist of the claim may 
have changed but the causal requirement has not. Secondly, whereas the material 
increase in risk test means that a defender may be held liable for an injury which, 
on a sine qua non basis, he did not actually cause, lost chance recovery provides 
an equitable via media to the problem of causal uncertainty by compensating 
only the pursuer’s loss of a chance of avoiding the harm, damages being valued by 
reference to the magnitude of the chance. Thus, if P has lost a one third chance of 
avoiding injuries valued at £3,000, P recovers only for the value of that chance (one 
third of £3,000, i.e. £1,000). Such an approach strikes a balance between letting 
off a defender who may in fact have caused the harm, and penalising a defender 
who may not have caused the harm at all.
Before Barker v Corus, the courts struggled to explain the conceptual differ-
ence between recovery for lost chances and for material increase in risk, and what 
the criteria were for the application of the one rather than the other. Given that 
the essential issue for both is the same,26  it seemed anomalous that in material 
increase in risk cases full recovery for the physical harm was allowed, while in 
lost chance cases there was recovery only in proportion to the magnitude of the 
chance. These problems were tackled in the Barker decision.
(4) Causal orthodoxy reasserted: Barker v Corus
It is no exaggeration to describe the Barker decision as the most important devel-
opment in British causal jurisprudence in the last twenty years.27 The facts of 
Barker were broadly similar to Fairchild, in that Barker had been materially 
exposed to asbestos during periods of employment with two employers (one of 
which was now insolvent and without any identifi ed insurer). In addition, however, 
Barker had suffered a third period of material exposure while self-employed. He 
died in 1996 from a mesothelioma of the pleura. Assuming that, as in Fairchild, 
the material increase in risk principle was to be utilised to fi nd the two employers 
jointly and severally liable for such an indivisible injury, the only solvent and 
insured defendant, Corus, would bear liability for the whole damages.
The House of Lords upheld a damages claim against both employers, but held 
that each was to be seen as having caused, not the physical harm itself, but only a 
26 Namely, is the pursuer prevented by some inherent causal uncertainty from demonstrating a causal 
connection between the harm and the wrongful conduct?
27 Barker v Corus (UK) plc [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 WLR 1027.
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proportion of the risk of such harm (Mr Barker having also contributed a propor-
tion through his own negligence). Further, and crucially, each defendant was liable 
only in proportion to the magnitude of the risk of injury to which it had exposed 
Mr Barker. The second fi nding, concerning apportionment, is discussed later;28 
the fi rst, concerning causation, merits a full examination now.
Whereas in Fairchild the House of Lords had replicated the approach of 
McGhee in holding the defendants liable in solidum on the basis that each, by 
contributing a material risk of injury to the claimant, had caused the injury, the 
majority in Barker recast the McGhee-Fairchild principle as one of loss of a 
chance. Material increase in risk was no longer to be seen as the equivalent of 
causing the actual harm, but was to be recognised for what it was: simply causation 
of the risk of an injury, or, to put it another way, causation of the loss of a chance 
or opportunity of avoiding that injury. Lord Hoffmann set out the new approach 
in the leading speech. He argued that, in Fairchild, while a minority had equated 
material increase in risk with material contribution (the McGhee approach), the 
majority had taken a different view.29 Referring to his own speech in Fairchild, 
he characterised his comparison between material increase in risk and material 
contribution as simply a legal analogy. Recognising this, it was more consistent 
to admit that, if the basis of liability was risk creation, then the damage caused 
ought to be seen not as the injury itself but as the creation of a risk or chance of 
such injury. Lord Hoffmann justifi ed this new approach to the McGhee-Fairchild 
principle on the basis of its fairness, saying it would “smooth the roughness of the 
justice” to defendants.30
Lord Rodger, in the minority, was scornful of attempts to recast the McGhee-
Fairchild principle in terms of loss of a chance. He found the speeches of the 
majority in McGhee and Fairchild to be quite clear: material increase in risk was 
to be treated as equivalent to a material contribution to the actual injury caused. 
Lord Hoffmann was doing nothing more than “rewriting the key decisions in 
McGhee”.31 Lord Rodger was sceptical that the new approach would be any fairer, 
as the majority claimed; on the contrary, in an attempt to improve the lot of defen-
dants and their insurers, innocent claimants would often be left only with a small 
proportion of damages.
While, however, Lord Rodger was strictly correct on the interpretation of the 
earlier authorities, Lord Hoffmann’s re-interpretation of those authorities, if 
somewhat strained, seems justifi ed by the legitimate goals of reasserting causal 
28 At B(5) below.
29 [2006] UKHL 20 at paras 31-34.
30 Para 43. 
31 Para 71. 
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orthodoxy and of fi nding a just balance, in cases of inherent causal uncertainty, 
between the interests of claimants and defendants. While the decision in Barker 
cannot bind the Scottish courts, it is suggested that, for the reasons set out earlier,32 
they should follow it.33
Where the Barker principle applies, each culpable defender will be held liable 
in damages only in proportion to the risk of injury which he contributed. This 
question of apportionment of loss will now be examined.
(5) Apportionment of loss
The basic rule regarding apportionment of liability for loss is not hard to grasp: a 
defender is liable for the loss he has caused. In the simple case of a sole defender 
D, so long as the whole of the identifi able and quantifi able loss suffered by the 
pursuer P has been caused by D alone, D is wholly and solely liable for that loss. 
Additionally, without there being any other defenders, if P has partly caused the 
loss, contributory negligence may be pled against him, and, if proved, P’s damages 
must be reduced to the extent a court “thinks just and equitable having regard to 
the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage”.34
In cases where two defenders D1 and D2 have each contributed to P’s loss, 
and have each caused a clearly identifi able amount of that loss (in other words, 
the damage is divisible into portions), the basic rule discussed in the previous 
paragraph equally applies: D1 is solely liable for the portion caused by him, and 
D2 solely for such portion caused by him. In Scotland this type of liability is called 
“several”, whereas in England the term “joint” liability is used, a difference which 
is apt to confuse.35
Of diffi culty for these established rules is Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings.36 
Although the disease suffered by the pursuer in this case was divisible (or “dose-
32 At B(3).
33 Barker-type cases are not, of course, the only problematic type of causal indeterminacy. Cases where 
what is causally uncertain is what the pursuer would have done in the absence of the defender’s fault have 
also recently troubled the courts: see Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. I have suggested elsewhere (see 
Hogg (n 1)) that the House of Lords’ solution in Chester (through the scope given to the duty of care) 
might be utilised to solve a number of types of causally indeterminate case; cf J Stapleton, “Occam’s razor 
reveals an orthodox basis for Chester v Afshar” (2006) 122 LQR 426, who argues that, while the result 
in Chester was correct, the reasoning should have been founded in a discussion of the scope of liability 
for the doctor’s breach of duty. 
34 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s 1(1). The courts have interpreted the phrase “share 
in the responsibility” by reference to a combination of objective causal potency and degree of fault: see 
Davies v Swann Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd [1949] 2 KB 291; Cork v Kirby McLean Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 
402; Porter v Strathclyde Regional Council 1991 SLT 446.
35 See, on this difference in terminology, G M Anderson, “Disease causation and the extent of material 
contribution” 2006 SLT (News) 87 at 92. For an example of such several liability see Barr v Neilson & 
Neilson (1868) 6 M 651.
36 1956 SC (HL) 26, [1956] AC 613.
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related”), so that the defender should only have been liable for the propor-
tionate degree of harm which its culpable contribution to the disease had made, 
the defender was in fact found liable for the whole of the pursuer’s loss. On the 
assumption that the relative contribution to the severity of the illness added by the 
defender’s negligence was capable of determination, this fi nding seems fl awed; 
on the other hand, it may be that the state of scientifi c knowledge at the time did 
not allow a reasonable assessment of the contribution made by the defender’s 
negligence.
The position is different, and more diffi cult, if the harm contributed by each 
defender is not readily distinguishable or divisible – so-called “indivisible injuries”. 
Common examples include non-dose-related diseases (as occurred in McGhee, 
Fairchild and Barker), and indivisible physical injuries (such as fractured limbs 
or death). In such cases, where two or more defenders have contributed to an 
indivisible injury, liability has traditionally been joint and several,37 which is to say 
each defender is liable either for a portion of the whole injury (as determined by 
the court, if an apportionment is asked for by defenders) or for the whole injury, at 
the option of the pursuer. In cases where the pursuer seeks recovery of the whole 
damages from one defender, that defender may subsequently seek to recover a 
contribution from the other defender or defenders. Such joint and several liability 
is a deviation from the basic rule outlined earlier, that a defender is liable only for 
such damage as he has caused, and is designed to avoid the argument that, because 
the precise extent of the damage caused cannot be shown, no award against the 
defender should be made. In Fairchild, given the indivisible nature of the disease 
involved, a fi nding of joint and several liability was, quite properly, made.38
The Barker decision has not changed matters. Because Barker redefi ned the 
gist of what was being sued for as divisible proportions of the overall risk of harm, 
the case was essentially about several (in Scots terms) or joint (in English terms) 
liability for  clearly separate and distinguishable injuries. Barker did not therefore 
disturb the exceptional rule of joint and several liability for indivisible harm: it 
simply recognised that cases of risk creation are cases of divisible harm, so that 
the ordinary rule of liability for harm, that a defender is liable only for the damage 
which he has caused, applies. The adverse effect this would have on a claimant’s 
position in mesothelioma cases has proved highly controversial and is discussed 
later.39
37 Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340 (pollution of a river by a number of wrongdoers).  
38 Although the defendants in Fairchild did not ask for an apportionment inter se, their Lordships noted 
that such an apportionment could quite properly have been made had it been requested.
39 At E below.
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C. FUTURE LOSSES: GREGG v SCOTT
Not all losses which are the subject of damages claims are demonstrable existing 
losses at the time the claim is raised. It has long been common for damages claims 
to relate to losses which, it is argued, will arise later. Of course, there will usually 
be causal uncertainty surrounding whether losses will or will not arise after the 
date of a court’s determination of liability, for future outcomes are determined in 
large part by the effects of presently unknowable future behaviour or events.40 
Nonetheless, in some cases courts are willing to infer that, on the balance of proba-
bilities, had the defender not been negligent, a loss would have been avoided in 
the future, even if such an inference is strictly fi ctional. In such cases, the future 
loss is treated as if it is a certainty. But, for the most part, future losses must be 
treated as indeterminate and therefore as having only a certain likelihood that they 
will occur. Courts assess the likelihood of such uncertain future losses and take this 
into account when awarding damages.41
Gregg v Scott42 involved a claim which related to what might occur in the 
future. While Mr Gregg argued that the negligence of his general practitioner 
had occasioned a delay in treatment which in turn had occasioned the enlarge-
ment of a malignant tumour, his claim for damages was not for the increase in 
the size of the tumour, nor indeed for the pain and suffering which such enlarge-
ment had caused. Although his claim had begun as an ordinary one for pain and 
injury consequent on the spread of cancer,43 it had been reframed as the action 
proceeded as one for either (i) loss of life expectancy consequent upon the spread 
of the cancer, or (ii) pure loss of life expectancy, not contingent upon any other 
loss. The medical evidence indicated that his chances of “survival” (defi ned by the 
medical experts involved in the case as remission from further adverse effects for 
ten years from the time of the negligence) had been reduced from 42% to 25% 
by the delay in treatment. While the reduced life expectancy could be described 
as a harm which Mr Gregg presently suffered, the ultimate harm which he feared 
– death caused by cancer – was a future loss which might never occur.44
Mr Gregg’s claim was rejected by a 3:2 majority of the House of Lords. This was 
because the sole damage of which a chance of avoidance had been lost was future 
damage rather than existing physical damage, and because the doctor’s negligence 
had not been the cause of any loss of a chance of avoiding future damage. A 
40 See further on the question of determinism in the causation of future events, Hogg (n 1) at 117-121. 
41 This point is discussed further below at section C(1) of this article.
42 [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176. 
43 [2005] 2 AC 176 at para 196 per Baroness Hale.
44 In fact, by the time the House of Lords handed down its decision Mr Gregg had survived for some nine 
and a half years of the ten years which had been regarded by the medical experts as “survival”. 
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further practical reason – that lost chance analysis is too complicated for medical 
negligence claims – was also adduced. It will be argued that only the fi rst of these 
reasons stands up to scrutiny.
(1) Future damage not existing physical damage
As stated earlier, Scottish and English Law will entertain certain claims in respect 
of possible future losses. At common law, a claimant can seek a once-and-for-
all award for all losses, which may include an element for possible future loss. 
Damages for possible future loss will be assessed according to the risk of its occur-
ring. While claims usually focus on lost future income (patrimonial loss), they may 
also include an element for future pain and suffering from a possible worsening 
in the pursuer’s physical condition as well as an element for any suffering caused 
by awareness of loss of life expectancy (non-patrimonial losses).45 Loss of life 
expectancy itself, however, is no longer a distinct head of recoverable damages.46 
Lost future income is usually compensated by way of a calculation of future lost 
earnings, so long as the claimant is likely (on the balance of probabilities) to die 
earlier than he would have done otherwise. Other lost future income may be taken 
into account too, in particular pension income. It is possible to include lost oppor-
tunities of less than 50% likelihood which, on the balance of probabilities, would 
have come the claimant’s way, such as the possibility of more lucrative employ-
ment or promotion. Courts must also consider the risk that the claimant would 
have lost his job through redundancy or some other reason and might therefore 
have been in a less advantageous position. These considerations have been well 
settled in the relevant Scots and English cases.47 When considering such future 
possibilities, the courts have to evaluate the level of risk of the harm occurring 
which will shorten the pursuer’s life, such level of risk then being factored in when 
the quantum of damages is assessed.
An alternative to the once-and-for-all common law damages award is for a 
claimant to utilise a statutory provision which permits a provisional damages claim 
for any existing loss (which might include damages for lost income on account of 
loss of life expectancy) as well as authorising the claimant to seek further damages 
in respect of a subsequently occurring serious disease or a serious deterioration 
45 Non-patrimonial loss is referred to as solatium in Scots Law. See further S A Bennett, Personal Injury 
Damages in Scotland, 4th edn (2005) ch 6; Scottish Law Commission, Report on The effect of Death on 
Damages (Scot Law Com No 134, 1992) paras 4.13-4.22.
46 Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s 9A(2); Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 1(1). 
47 See, for instance, Sellar’s CB v Glasgow Victoria and Leverndale Hospitals 1973 SLT (Notes) 3; Moeliker 
v A Reyrolle & Co Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 132; Chan Wai Tong v Li Ping Sum [1985] AC 446; Wall v Bryant 
1994 SLT 1260; Robertson’s CB v Anderson 1996 SC 217 at 224-5 per Lord Clyde; Hill v Wilson 1997 
SC 81; Hendrie v The Scottish Ministers 2003 SCLR 642; Watt v Bridges 2004 RepLR 96.
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in his physical condition if and when this occurs.48 If the claimant opts to use this 
statutory route, his provisional award cannot include damages for possible future 
physical harm, as this future physical harm will be fully compensated by the later 
claim if and when it is made.
The claimant’s choice is thus between a once-off, full damages award for all 
present and possible future loss (future loss being assessed by reference to the risk 
of its occurring), and a provisional award for all presently suffered loss together 
with the option of a further claim for physical deterioration should it occur.
Why then could not Mr Gregg have attempted to raise either a common law 
claim for the risk of future harm, or a statutory claim for provisional damages with 
the possibility of a later claim for subsequent deterioration? The obstacle lay in 
the fact that the courts have taken the view that, regardless of which of these two 
routes is utilised, any claim must follow on the back of a claim for existing demon-
strable physical injury.49 There has to be a present physical loss to which can be 
attached additional possible future losses. What type of injury can constitute such 
presently claimable loss is discussed in section D below. Perhaps Mr Gregg might 
have attempted to argue that the enlargement of his tumour was such existing 
physical loss.50 But in the event he claimed merely for reduced life expectancy, 
with the result that the majority of their Lordships concluded that his claim could 
not succeed.
As the foregoing discussion shows, the courts are not averse to claims for future 
possible loss per se. Such claims must, however, be attached to a claim for presently 
suffered physical harm – a requirement which has been adopted, quite reason-
ably, as a mechanism for controlling speculative lost chance recovery in cases of 
personal injury. Without it, any party exposed to medical negligence might claim 
for possible future losses. Consider the following example:
A thousand women aged between 35 and 45 are screened for breast cancer at a hospital. 
The medical examinations are negligently carried out so that no woman who is at 
high risk of developing breast cancer is properly identifi ed. The hospital’s omission 
is not discovered for ten years. Medical evidence indicates that such delay creates an 
increased 15% risk that a woman will suffer from irremediable breast cancer. Can each 
of the thousand women who have not in any event gone on to develop breast cancer 
48 For the relevant statutory provision¸ see Supreme Court Act 1981 s 32A (for England) and Administra-
tion of Justice Act 1982 s 12 (for Scotland). For an example of an award of provisional damages under the 
statutory provision, see Walker v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd 4 May 1995, (English) Court of Appeal, 
unreported. 
49 This restriction was noted in Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 in the speeches of Lord Phillips (para 177), 
Lord Hope (para 118) and Lord Nicholls (para 44). There seems to be no theoretical reason why, in an 
appropriate case, the existing demonstrable injury might not be economic loss.
50 Lord Hope, in the minority, effectively rewrote Mr Gregg’s claim, arguing (para 117) that it amounted 
to a claim that his tumour had increased in size, a demonstrable existing loss, such that an additional 
claim for reduced life expectancy could be added to it. 
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sue in respect of their lost chance of avoiding irremediable breast cancer even if they 
cannot show any current ill effects?51
Without the requirement that a future lost chance claim must be tied to a present 
physical loss, the answer in this example must be yes, at least in the absence of any 
other factor preventing recovery. On the basis that such claims are undesirable, 
the requirement makes sense as a mechanism for controlling liability for personal 
injury, and indeed performs the same function as other limiting requirements such 
as the requirement of foreseeability of loss in relation to remoteness of damages, 
and the restrictions placed upon secondary nervous shock claims.
(2) Doctor’s negligence not the cause of the loss
A second reason suggested in the speeches of the majority in Gregg was that, even 
if Mr Gregg’s claim for loss of life expectancy were to be considered a presently 
suffered and actionable loss, such loss could not be demonstrated to have been 
caused by the negligence of his doctor rather than by his pre-existing cancer.52
It is hard to see what precisely is meant here. Of course the available evidence 
could not permit a determination of whether the loss of life expectancy had been 
caused by the delay in diagnosis or treatment (possible cause 1) or whether such 
delay made no difference because the loss of life expectancy would have resulted 
in any event because of Mr Gregg’s pre-existing cancer (possible cause 2). But 
this is precisely the causal uncertainty that existed in Fairchild, where it could 
not be proved whether the mesothelioma had been caused during Mr Fairch-
ild’s fi rst period of exposure to asbestos (possible cause 1) or during one of the 
subsequent periods of exposure (possible causes 2, 3, etc). In both Gregg and 
Fairchild there existed the same kind of inherent uncertainty about the cause of 
the loss, a view which is confi rmed by the recasting in Barker of the Fairchild and 
McGhee decisions as loss of a chance claims. To assert, as Lord Hoffmann and 
Lady Hale do in Gregg, that Mr Gregg’s claim must fail because of the uncer-
tainty surrounding what caused his loss of life expectancy would logically lead 
to the conclusion that the claims in McGhee, Fairchild and Barker ought also to 
have failed. Moreover, to assert that a difference lies in the fact that in Gregg the 
claimant was already suffering from cancer before the negligent act whereas in 
Fairchild the claimant was healthy, is to rely upon an irrelevant distinction. This 
51 Or, to take another example suggested by Lady Hale in Gregg (at para 212), should a defendant who had 
exposed someone to cigarette smoke, thereby increasing his risk of contracting lung cancer, be liable 
even though the person exposed showed no signs of current ill health?
52 See the speeches of Lord Hoffmann (at para 68) and Lady Hale (para 200). Lady Hale does, however, 
admit that a claim against the doctor might have lain for temporal acceleration of pain and suffering 
(para 206). Such claims for accelerated loss are established in Scots law: see, for instance, Sutherland v 
North British Steel Group 1986 SLT (Sh Ct) 29.
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distinction does not change the nature of the inherent uncertainty in each case, 
which lies in our inability, in the state of current medical knowledge, to determine 
whether the loss was due to the defender’s negligence or to another factor capable 
of causing the harm.
This second ground for denying liability must be considered fl awed. In the 
light of Barker, a denial of future Gregg-type claims on the basis that the identity 
of the proper cause of the harm is uncertain cannot be maintained. That type of 
uncertainty is of the very nature of a loss of a chance claim.
(3) Loss of chance analysis too diffi cult for medical negligence cases
Lord Phillips, following a complicated analysis of the differing prospects of Mr 
Gregg’s avoiding different adverse consequences, concluded that the complexities 
involved in determining the various chances of the different outcomes was a policy 
factor mitigating against introducing lost chance recovery into medical negligence 
claims: “A robust test which produces rough justice may be preferable to a test 
that on occasion will be diffi cult, if not impossible, to apply with confi dence in 
practice.”53
Was this conclusion justifi ed? On the facts of the case before him, it seems not. 
Mr Gregg was not claiming in respect of the different possible outcomes listed by 
Lord Phillips (such as psychiatric distress) but merely for the reduced chance of 
avoiding an earlier death. Given this, it would have been necessary for the court 
only to calculate a single loss of a chance fi gure. No doubt this would have been 
diffi cult, involving weighing up different versions of medical evidence as to the 
statistics relevant to people in Mr Gregg’s position, and deciding, on the balance of 
probabilities, the magnitude of chance of avoiding an early death lost by the delay 
in diagnosis and treatment, but it would not have been much harder than weighing 
up any other evidence on the balance of probabilities. Admittedly, if a pursuer 
claims in respect of multiple lost chances, the diffi culties are greater, 54 but that 
might occur in commercial as well as in medical cases, and in the simple case any 
problems should not be overstated. In any event, given the subsequent decision 
in Barker, that courts are required to evaluate the magnitude of lost chances in 
applying the modifi ed Fairchild principle, the concerns of Lord Phillips must be 
seen as having been overtaken by legal development.
53 Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 at para 170 per Lord Phillips, para 226 per Lady Hale.
54 Where multiple possible chances are at issue, the courts have struggled to determine what the proper 
damages in a lost chance case should be: see on this point an analysis of the multiple lost chance case 
of Paul v Ogilvy 2001 SLT 171 in M Hogg, “Paul v Ogilvy: a lost opportunity for lost chance recovery” 
(2003) 7 EdinLR 86. 
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(4) Conclusion
In conclusion, what would give genuine cause for concern about setting manage-
able bounds of recovery were a Gregg-type case to give rise to liability would be 
neither that the action would be for loss of a chance per se (for Barker shows that 
such recovery in personal injury claims is now possible), nor that there would be 
uncertainty as to who caused the loss of a chance (for such uncertainty is precisely 
of the essence of lost chance recovery). Rather, the cause for concern would lie 
in the fact that lost chance recovery shorn of any requirement of attachment to 
existing physical loss would lead to a massive expansion in liability founded purely 
on indeterminate causal connection to ultimate future harm. Given the huge 
increase in the volume and scope of claims which might arise, and the consequent 
negative impact upon liability costs for both private insurers and the National 
Health Service,55 it does not seem unreasonable that the courts have continued to 
characterise Gregg-type loss of a chance claims as posing a danger to manageable 
personal injury liability.56
D. THE SEARCH FOR NEW TYPES OF ACTIONABLE LOSS ON TO 
WHICH TO ATTACH LOST CHANCE CLAIMS
(1) Demonstrable physical injury
As discussed in the previous section, one approach which the claimant in Gregg 
might have taken would have been to argue that there had been demonstrable 
existing physical injury by virtue of the fact that his cancerous tumour had increased 
in size.57 Given this possible approach, a crucial point for future cases becomes: 
what counts as demonstrable physical injury?
The notion of “injury” requires, of course, that there be an injurious effect 
upon the pursuer, which might be constituted by pain and suffering, or by external 
physical manifestation even in the absence of pain. A deformed or missing limb 
clearly constitutes injury, as does a scar, scratch, burn, or even change in skin 
pigmentation. All are external and visible. What, however, of mere internal biolog-
ical or cellular alteration, not attended by pain or suffering, not productive of 
adverse symptoms, and not of itself indicative of any likely future harm? Can 
such internal biological or cellular alteration count as physical injury, whether 
55 Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 at para 90 per Lord Hoffmann. Lord Nicholls (para 53) was not impressed 
by these considerations.
56 The Irish Supreme Court has taken a different view, holding in Philp v Ryan [2004] IESC 105 that, even 
though medical negligence did not cause the plaintiff any physical ill effects, damages were nonetheless 
to be awarded for the patient’s deprivation of life expectancy and resultant anxiety.
57 Although Lord Hoffmann seemed to doubt that simple enlargement of a tumour was physical injury at 
all: see [2005] 2 AC 176 at para 87. 
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 considered on its own or taken together with other factors? Older authorities 
on this matter are not especially helpful, as, in the days before x-ray technology, 
internal injury which had no consequential external manifestation or symptoms of 
pain was not detectable. For that reason injury in early legal authority is conceived 
of in terms of visible defect or pain. However, it was precisely the question of 
internal asymptomatic change which was raised by the most recent asbestos litiga-
tion, Grieves v FT Everard & Sons Ltd.58
Each of the claimants in Grieves had been negligently exposed by one of 
the defendants to asbestos fi bres and consequently developed pleural plaques 
or pleural thickening.59 In themselves, both conditions are benign and do not 
lead directly to any other condition,60 whether benign or malignant. However, 
the presence of pleural plaques or pleural thickening can indicate a cumulative 
level of asbestos exposure at which there is a heightened risk of further asbestos-
related diseases. It was argued that this exposure to asbestos put the claimants 
at an increased risk of developing mesothelioma at some future stage, as well as 
causing them to suffer from fear of contracting mesothelioma and, in the case of 
the fi rst appellant, a depressive psychiatric illness resulting from such fear. The 
claimants sought to use the pleural plaques as a hook on which to attach these 
further “injuries”. The Court of Appeal rejected the claims, holding by a majority 
that: (i) the development of pleural plaques was insuffi ciently signifi cant of itself 
to constitute damage on which a claim in negligence could be founded, nor was 
that position altered by attaching a further claim in respect of increased risk of 
contracting a future illness or fear of so doing; (ii) no claim could be made in 
respect of the chance of contracting a future disease if that was not consequent on 
some physical injury; and (iii) fear of future illness was not of itself a freestanding 
head of damage and, in the case of the appellant suffering a psychiatric illness, this 
was unforeseeable so far as the defendant in question was concerned.
It is suggested that the Court of Appeal was correct in holding both that pleural 
plaques are not suffi ciently injurious per se, unless they occasion some physical 
discomfi ture or other adverse symptom, and that fear of illness or the risk of 
future harm are not types of injury which can be claimed in the absence of some 
form of actionable physical injury.61 That is enough to conclude that the decision 
58 [2006] EWCA Civ 27. The Court of Appeal dismissed the joint actions. An appeal has been made to the 
House of Lords and is likely to be heard in the fi rst half of 2007.
59 For an explanation of these conditions, see the judgment of Lord Phillips CJ in Grieves at paras 10 f. 
As pleural plaques and pleural thickening are essentially variations of the same kind of internal cellular 
mutation, they are referred to in this text simply by reference to the former term.
60 In 1% of cases pleural plaques can cause respiratory discomfort, but this is not serious.
61 Cf the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in Philp v Ryan [2004] IESC 105. The only harm caused to 
Mr Philp was distress in respect of reduced life expectancy, and in the reduction of life expectancy itself. 
No physical ill effects were caused by the doctor’s negligence. Despite the absence of any such physical 
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was correct. On the further point that de minimis harms62 cannot be cumulated 
to constitute actionable harm, it is suggested that the court overstated matters 
somewhat. Many de minimis types of harm can be cumulated in assessing the 
pursuer’s overall state. However, the rule against cumulating lost chances and fear 
of illness with de minimis harm seems to be an exception to this rule, so that, on 
the specifi c facts of the case, accumulation was impermissible and the conclusion 
of the court correct.
(2) Pleural plaques as harm
Given that, save in exceptional cases, pleural plaques produce neither physical 
sensation nor any other physical effect, the conclusion of the majority of the 
Court of Appeal in Grieves was that they are not actionable damage. The opposite 
conclusion was reached by Smith LJ, who argued that (i) in that small percentage 
of pleural plaque cases which are attended by physical discomfi ture, pleural 
plaques are considered harm, so that in such cases it cannot be the symptoms 
which are the injury but the plaques themselves, and (ii) visible benign tissue 
change can constitute harm, and there is no reason to treat internal tissue changes 
 differently.
These two points are, at fi rst blush, challenging for the majority’s view, but it is 
suggested that they can be adequately countered. First, when assessing whether 
an injury has occurred, the courts usually consider physical change and pain 
together. Pain by necessity requires the presence of physical change, even if this 
is merely at the level of cellular change, nerve impulse, or muscular or vascular 
contraction. A migraine headache, for instance, is the result of vascular contrac-
tion affecting blood fl ow to the brain. Physical alteration is not always attended 
by pain, however. I may be knocked over yet suffer no pain, even if some cellular 
alteration will have occurred as a result of the fall. In such a case, I have not 
been injured, at least in a way that constitutes more than de minimis harm. The 
purpose of looking for pain or suffering when physical alteration occurs is to see 
whether that alteration is suffi ciently serious. Secondly, if external physical altera-
tion occurs without pain, a court may nonetheless consider that serious enough of 
itself to constitute harm, but this is because the courts see a difference between 
painless alterations which are internal and those which are external. More value 
is attached to external physical alterations because our personalities are defi ned 
“hook” on which to hang his claim, Mr Philp was awarded damages for reduced life expectancy and for 
his distress. Specifi c reference was made by the court to the allegedly analogous case of common awards 
for “the risk that an injured plaintiff may in the future develop arthritis in an injured joint”.
62 By de minimis harms must be understood harms which do not make a material contribution to the injury 
sustained.
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in large part by the appearance we present to the world. The conclusion of the 
majority in Grieves that asymptomatic, internal cellular change is not suffi ciently 
injurious to sound in damages is a perfectly reasonable one.
In apparent contrast to the conclusion of the majority in Grieves, the Court of 
Session has taken the view that negligently caused pleural plaques are of themselves 
injurious, holding them actionable in the presence of other harm. Unfortunately, 
in neither of the relevant decisions was there any substantial consideration as 
to whether pleural plaques constitute injury per se: it was simply assumed that 
they do.63 Given this fact, the position of the Scottish courts on pleural plaques 
as injurious per se cannot be seen as settled, and it is likely that the consideration 
by the House of Lords of the matter in the forthcoming Grieves appeal will be 
determinative of the question on both sides of the border.
(3) Chance/fear of future illness as harm64
From the earlier discussion of Fairchild and Gregg, it will be plain that the House 
of Lords is presently unwilling to treat a mere chance of contracting a future illness, 
unconnected to any presently suffered physical loss, as actionable. The likelihood of 
a short term change in this view is small, even if it were to be thought  desirable.
As for fear of future illness as freestanding harm, mental distress caused by 
an existing physical injury may certainly be claimable as damages, this falling in 
Scotland within the claim for solatium. Additionally, mental distress caused by a 
fear that a current injury may worsen or may lead to further deleterious conse-
quences can also be something for which damages may be awarded. However, 
both in Scotland and England, mental distress which is not consequent upon 
an existing physical harm is not claimable. For example, if P is exposed by D to 
radiation, and suffers no immediate physical harm, but fears that he may develop 
leukaemia in the future, this fear is not something for which damages may be 
sought. As with the risk of contracting a future illness, the requirement that fear 
of harm be attached to an existing physical harm provides a policy-inspired brake 
upon personal injury liability, ensuring that large numbers of wholly speculative 
claims are precluded.
63 Nicol v Scottish Power plc 1998 SLT 822; Gibson v McAndrew Wormald 1998 SLT 562 esp at 563 per 
Lord Maclean.
64 It is not proposed to discuss whether the Court of Appeal was correct in rejecting Mr Grieves’ freestand-
ing claim in respect of having suffered a psychiatric illness in consequence of his developing pleural 
plaques. However, the test propounded by Lord Lloyd in Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 at 190 B-E for 
such claims by primary victims would seem to suggest that, given the exposure of Mr Grieves by his 
employer to asbestos, some kind of personal injury was reasonably foreseeable, even if not psychiatric 
injury per se, and therefore that freestanding liability should have been imposed for his psychiatric 
illness.
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(4) Cumulating de minimis harms to constitute actionable harm
The view of the majority in Grieves was that there was no authority beyond fi rst 
instance decisions for “aggregating three heads of claim which, individually, could 
not found a cause of action, so as to constitute suffi cient damage to give rise to a 
legal claim.”65 Certainly this is true if the heads of claim relate to harms lacking in 
adverse physical effect and which would be unclaimable individually. More contro-
versial, however, is the inference that it is impermissible to aggregate a number of 
de minimis harms, each on its own causing an adverse (if minor) physical effect. 
Such circumstances might arise in cases either of single or multiple defenders. 
Take, for instance, a case where twenty polluters each release de minimis levels 
of pollution into a river, and the cumulative effect is that a farmer’s herd of cattle 
is poisoned. Ought a claim in delict against each of the defenders to be barred? 
If no action lies in such a case, then, given the overall totality of harm infl icted 
upon the victim, the purpose of the law of delict to enforce restorative justice is 
arguably being thwarted.66
Upholding that purpose suggests that courts ought to have regard to the totality 
of the harm in order to decide whether P has been harmed by D, or by D1, D2, 
D3, etc. For physical harms, aggregation ought thus to be possible, if it is not so 
presently. The farmer ought to have an action against the twenty polluters for the 
indivisible harm of the death of his cattle, regardless of the fact that the contribu-
tion of each was de minimis; and the liability of the twenty should be joint and 
several. However, it does seem from the earlier discussion that some types of 
harm, including fear of harm and lost opportunities of avoiding future physical 
harm, cannot be aggregated with physical harm unless that harm is more than 
merely de minimis. This is a reasonable policy-based exception to what should be 
the normal ability of pursuers to ask a court to consider the totality of the harm 
they have suffered. The policy exists because the court considers bodily, physical 
harm to be the most serious type of harm. If a pursuer wishes to use it as a hook 
on which to hang other non-physical injuries, such as a reduced likelihood of 
avoiding future harm, that physical harm should be serious enough, of itself, to 
be actionable.
E. SOME CONCLUSIONS
In recent case law, questions of causation, apportionment of damage, and action-
able injury have posed intellectually challenging problems of the most  fundamental 
65 [2006] EWCA Civ 27 at para 68 per Lord Phillips CJ and Longmore LJ.
66 Although non-recoverability in such cases does seem to be the position in other European jurisdic-
tions.
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importance in the law of delict and tort. As a result, the following may now be 
taken as settled.
In the fi rst place, it is preferable to analyse a material increase in the risk of harm 
as causation of the risk, such risk of harm being seen as the actionable damage. 
This view, asserted by the House of Lords in Barker, has reconciled the divergent 
streams of material increase in risk and lost chance claims, and has re-established 
causal orthodoxy after thirty years of wayward analysis following McGhee.
Secondly, having confi rmed that lost chance recovery is the rock upon which 
many cases of causal uncertainty is founded, the House of Lords has clarifi ed 
that, where the identity of the person causing the harm is in doubt, lost chance 
recovery imposes not joint and several liability upon defenders for the whole of 
the pursuer’s loss, but merely several liability upon each defender for the extent 
of the risk of harm that he has caused.
Thirdly, a claim for loss of future expectancies or avoidance of future harm is only 
maintainable in the presence of existing physical injury suffered by the pursuer or 
claimant. In reaffi rming this view, the House of Lords in Gregg has sensibly avoided 
opening up personal injury law to merely speculative claims of future harm.
The appeal in Grieves is due to come before the House of Lords at some point 
during 2007. It is to be hoped that their Lordships will take the opportunity to 
reaffi rm the view of the Court of Appeal that a claimant cannot cumulate other-
wise de minimis claims for lost expectancy or anxiety with physical harm which he 
has suffered if that physical harm is itself merely de minimis, and that symptomatic 
pleural plaques are not suffi ciently injurious of themselves to constitute action-
able harm, despite the fact that they were frequently treated as such by the legal 
profession for the twenty years or so prior to the Grieves litigation. Both of these 
conclusions of the Court of Appeal are justifi able by sound policy reasons relating 
to the appropriate boundaries of personal injury law.
It is worth concluding by noting that, given recent newsprint generated by 
asbestos liability cases, it is unsurprising that interested parties such as victims’ 
compensation groups lobbied both the Westminster and Scottish Parliaments 
for legislative change to improve the rights of negligently-caused mesothelioma 
sufferers. In May 2006, Des McNulty MSP proposed a Member’s Bill before 
the Scottish Parliament which would have had the effect of amending section 
1(2) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 in relation to claims by relatives of 
injured persons.67 That Bill ran out of parliamentary time, but the proposal was 
67 In his supporting statement for the Bill, Mr McNulty asserted that “The House of Lords judgement in 
Barker v Corus … is contrary to accepted principles of Scots Law, as set out in the published dissenting 
opinion of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry.” This presupposes that the approach taken in McGhee was correct 
which, it has been suggested in this article, it was not. 
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 subsequently adopted by the Scottish Executive as the Rights of Relatives to 
Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Bill and is now before the Scottish Parlia-
ment.68
On the separate question of the apportionment of liability issue raised by the 
Barker decision, the Scottish Parliament voted to allow Westminster to legislate on 
a UK-wide basis. This was achieved in section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006,69 
which reinstates joint and several liability in respect of the causation of asbestos-
related mesothelioma of the pleura,70 thereby reversing that aspect of the Barker 
decision.71 Defenders may continue to seek an apportionment of liability inter se, 
and awards may be reduced in respect of contributory negligence.72 Additionally, 
in order to protect properly insured defenders from bearing the burden of liability 
in cases where co-defenders are uninsured, and thus potentially unable to meet 
their liability, the statute provides for Treasury regulations to set up a compensa-
tion fund from which defenders may seek a contribution in respect of the portion 
of total liability due by co-defenders unable to pay.73
Whilst this legislative development has, on the face of it, restored an unfair-
ness pinpointed by the majority in Barker, namely that joint and several liability 
in cases of indeterminate causation imposes upon defenders liability in solidum 
for losses which, in actuality, they may not have not caused at all, the sting has 
been taken out of the tail through provision of a statutory compensation fund to 
ensure that solvent and insured defenders are not forced to bear the burden of 
insolvent or uninsured co-defenders. This seems a reasonable compromise which 
should satisfy victims’ groups as well as employers and insurers. The legislation 
has sensibly not sought to undo Barker’s general realignment of material increase 
in risk cases as lost chance cases, nor has it tampered with the rules of causation 
in mesothelioma cases. It remains to be seen whether such realignment will fi nd 
favour within the academic community, but it has been suggested in this article 
that, for reasons of causal orthodoxy, the approach of the majority in Barker should 
be welcomed.
68 SP Bill 75, Session 2 (2006). The Bill was introduced on 27 September 2006.
69 The Act received Royal Assent on 25 July 2006, and section 3, on liability for mesothelioma, came into 
force on the same day. Section 3 is given retrospective effect, although without affecting claims settled 
before 3 May 2006: see s 16(3), (4).
70 The exposure caused by the defender must have been the result of negligence or breach of statutory 
duty (s 3(1)(a)), and the cause of the mesothelioma must, “because of the nature of mesothelioma and 
the state of medical science”, be indeterminate (s 3(1)(c)).
71 Compensation Act 2006 s 3(1), (2).
72 Section 3(3).
73 Section 3(7). 
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